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Abstract
Blind quantum computation (BQC) protocol allows a client having partially quantum ability to del-
egate his quantum computation to a remote quantum server without leaking any information about the
input, the output and the intended computation. Recently, many BQC protocols have been proposed with
the intention to make the ability of client more classical. In this paper, we propose two BQC protocols,
in which the client does not have to generate photons, but only has to perform either rotation or reorder
on the received photons.
Keywords: Blind Quantum Computation; Quantum Cryptography.
1 Introduction
Quantum computation is one based on the principle of quantum mechanics. Compared with classical compu-
tation, it provides the advantage on calculation speed [1]. For example, quantum computer can simulate the
property of quantum mechanics, and it is very difficult for classical computer to do that [2]. Shor’s algorithm
[3] offers an exponential speedup over the best-known classical solution for factorizing big integers and solving
discrete logarithm problems, and Grover’s algorithm [4] are also much faster than the best-known classical
search algorithms.
However, realization of quantum computer is still an enormous challenge now. Although quantum com-
puter appears to be very promising, it still has a long way to go before it becomes popular. Consequently,
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in the near future only a few expensive quantum servers can be accessed by clients who have to perform
quantum computation, but with only a limited quantum ability. Hence, the clients may have to delegate his
problem to a quantum server without revealing his/her information, including the input, the output and the
intended computation revealed to the server. Blind quantum computation (BQC) protocol is particularly
suitable to satisfy this requirement.
Based on quantum circuit model, Childs [5] proposed the first BQC protocol, where clients need quantum
memory and the ability to perform SWAP gate. Arrighi et al. [6] also proposed a BQC protocol, in which the
client needs to prepare entanglement states and measure them. However, these protocols are not universal
protocols, in the sense that they only work on certain classical function, and even the server can reveal
partial information of the client. Broadbent et al. [7] then presented the first universal BQC protocol, where
a client does not have any quantum computation ability and quantum memory except generating rotated
single photon and the private information of the client can be unconditionally secure. After that, many BQC
protocols have been proposed with the intention to make the ability of client more classical. Li et al. [8]
proposed a triple-server BQC protocol using entanglement state and Xu et al. [9] proposed a single-server
BQC protocol based on Li et al.’s protocol. Both Li et al. and Xu et al. claimed that in their protocol the
client only needs to have a quantum channel to receive and resend photons. However, these protocols have to
assume the existence of a trusted center, which is not practical in reality. Besides, Hung et al. [10] pointed
out that both Li et al.’s and Xu et al.’s protocols are not secure because server can get the information of
the client.
This paper intends to design two secure BQC protocols without trusted center. The clients in the new
BQC protocols only have to perform either rotation operation or reorder the particles.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Broadbent et al.’s BQC protocol.
Section 3 proposes two BQC protocols. Section 4 analyzes the security of two proposed protocols. Finally, a
concluding remark is given in Section 5.
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2 Review Broadbent et al.’s BQC protocol
Before presenting our protocol, let us briefly review Broadbent et al.’s BQC protocol first. Suppose that
a client Alice with limited quantum capability wants to delegate a quantum problem to a quantum server
Bob on the m-qubit graph states corresponding to the graph G without revealing any information about the
input, the output and the intended computation. The Broadbent et al.’s protocol can be briefly described as
follows.
Step1. Alice preparesm qubits and sends them to Bob. The state of each qubit is |θi〉 = |0〉+e
iθi |1〉 (i = 1, 2, ...,m),
where θi is selected randomly from the set S = {kpi/4|k = 0, 1, ..., 7}.
Step2. Alice asks Bob to generate a brickwork state according to the graph G specified by her.
Step3. According to the graphG, Bob produces a brickwork state |G (θ)〉 by applying CTRL-Z gates between
the qubits sent from Alice.
Step4. Alice sends δi = θi + φ
′
i + ripi to Bob, where ri ∈ {0, 1} is randomly selected by Alice and φ
′
i is a
modification of φi that depends on the previous measurement outcomes. Then Bob can measure the
ith qubits (i = 1, 2, ...,m) of |G (θ)〉.
Step5. Bob performs a measurement on the ith qubit (i = 1, 2, ...,m) in the basis {|±δi〉} and sends Alice
the measurement result.
Step6. Alice can get the computation output from the measurement result.
In Broadbent et al.’s protocol, Alice needs the ability of generating rotated single photon. However, the
ability of generating rotated single photon for a client is still considered to be very difficult now.
3 Proposed BQC protocols
This section proposes two BQC protocols. Each reduces the client’s quantum ability to only rotation operation
on the particles or to reorder the particles. The details of these two protocols are described in Sec. 3.1 and
Sec. 3.2 respectively.
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3.1 The first proposed protocol
Step1. Bob prepares m qubits and sends them one-by-one to Alice. The state of each qubit is |+〉.
Step2. Alice preforms rotation operation Zθi on each qubit received from Bob, where θi is selected randomly
from the set S.
Step3. Alice sends back this qubit to Bob.
Step4. Since Bob has the m qubit graph state ⊗mi=1 |θi〉 (i = 1, 2, ...,m), and only Alice knows the values
of θi, Alice can run Broadbent et al.’s single-server BQC protocol from Step 2, Bob’s preparation, to
delegate the quantum problem to Bob.
3.2 The second proposed protocol
Step1. Bob generates m Bell pairs |ψ0,0 (Bk, Ak)〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) (k = 1, 2, ..., 2n) and sends the particle
Ak of each Bell state to Alice.
Step2. After Alice receives all particles sent from Bob, she reorders those particles and sends them back to
Bob.
Step3. Alice sends m classical message {θi}
m
i=1 to Bob, where θi is selected randomly form the set S.
Step4. Bob measures his m particles Bk in the basis {±θk}
m
k=1 and sends the measurement results {bk}
m
k=1
to Alice.
Step5. Upon receiving {bk}
m
k=1 form Bob, she knows the state of each Ak Bob kept by the measurement
results {bk}
m
k=1 and the reorder information.
Step6. Since Bob has the qubit graph state ⊗mi=1 |θi + bipi〉 (i = 1, 2, ...,m), and only Alice knows the values
of θi and bi, Alice can run Broadbent et al.’s single-server BQC protocolfrom Step 2, Bob’s preparation,
to delegate the quantum problem to Bob.
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4 Security Analysis and Comparison
4.1 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security analysis about both proposed protocols. Since the security of Broadbent
et al.’s BQC protocol has been proved, we only focus on the privacy of {θi}
n
i=1; if Bob obtains the θ of each
particles, then he can calculate the input, the output and the intended computation.
In the first proposed protocol, since Alice performs the rotation operation Zθ on the particles in private
and then sends them back to Bob, only Alice knows the θ of each particle. Hence, this protocol is as secure
as Broadbent et al.’s protocol.
In the second proposed protocol, because Bob knows the measurement basis ±θ and the measurement
result for each particle Bk, he can calculate the state of Ak. However, since only Alice knows the new order
of the particles {Ak}
m
k=1 sent from Alice to Bob, Bob cannot find which two particles have entanglement.
Hence, Bob cannot know the state of each Ak, and hence this protocol is as secure as Broadbent et al.’s
protocol.
4.2 Comparison
In this sub-section, we give a comparison of Broadbent et al.’s BQC protocol and two proposed BQC protocols
(see also Table 1). In Broadbent et al.’s protocol, the client needs the ability to generate rotated single qubits;
in the first proposed protocol, the client’s ability is reduced to preforming rotation operation; in the second
proposed protocol, the client only needs to reorder the particles. However, to achieve this reduction on the
client’s ability, the second proposed protocol pays the cost: it needs some devices to prevent Trojans horse
attack, and the qubit efficiency of second proposed protocol is lower than Broadbent et al.’s protocol and the
first proposed protocol.
5 Conclusions
This paper has proposed two BQC protocols for a client to delegate a quantum computation to a remote
quantum server without revealing the input, the output and the intended computation. In both proposed
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Table 1: Comparison table
Broadbent’s
protocol
The first
proposed protocol
The second
proposed protocol
Client ability generate qubits rotation operation reorder
Qubit efficiency 1/1 1/1 1/2
Trojans horse attack
Automatically
prevent
Automatically
prevent
Need device
to prevent
protocols, the client needs less quantum ability than in Broadbent et al.’s protocol. Whereas the client in
the first protocol needs to preform rotation operation on the particles, the client in the second protocol only
needs the ability to reorder the particles. We have shown that both proposed protocols are as secure as
Broadbent et al.’s protocol. Yet, how to further reduce a client’s quantum ability in a BQC without revealing
any client’s information will be a promising future work.
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